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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PARADOX OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: POLITICAL
CONFORMITY AND CHAOS IN THE AFTERMATH OF
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION

KEVIN M. KRUSE*

I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of Brown v. Board of Education, Southern politicians
defiantly declared that they would never submit to that “intolerable” and
“monstrous” decision of the U.S. Supreme Court. Instead, they promised to
stage a fierce political campaign of “massive resistance” to court-ordered
desegregation. Indeed, for the remainder of the 1950s, the defiance of these
segregationists dominated the political, social, and legal landscape of the
region and choked off all progress towards meaningful integration.
These leaders of massive resistance claimed they were defending the
individual rights of Southerners, but in truth their movement was one based
first and foremost on the concept of conformity. Hoping to maintain white
supremacy through white solidarity, segregationists pushed through a wide
array of legislation that severely restricted the range of political and social
discourse in the region. Not content merely to shore up their segregationist
base, the forces of massive resistance also targeted the small numbers of white
liberals and black activists in their midst, effectively marginalizing them from
the Southern scene for the better part of a decade. Ironically, however, this
sweeping campaign of top-down political pressure precluded any meaningful
attempt at organizing ordinary white Southerners. In the end, as the combined
power of the courts and the civil rights movement dismantled the machinery of
massive resistance across the South, these politicians found that the whites
whom they purported to lead were nowhere to be found.1
This, then, was the fundamental paradox of the massive resistance
movement. The region’s leading segregationists succeeded in their quest for
rigid political conformity, only to find that their actions did nothing to get

* Kevin M. Kruse is Assistant Professor of History and David L. Rike University Preceptor of
History at Princeton University. He is the author of White Flight: Race, Place and Politics in
Atlanta, forthcoming from Princeton University Press.
1. See generally NUMAN V. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1950’S 67-81, 190-236, 341-43 (1969).
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ordinary whites organized for their cause. This problem played itself out in all
the Southern states, to one degree or another, but it is perhaps most clearly
observed in Georgia.
There, the state’s segregationists created a
comprehensive political program of massive resistance, overseen by major
officeholders and official watchdog groups like the Georgia Commission on
Education. These forces not only succeeded in enforcing conformity for the
vast majority of white Georgians, but also managed to identify and isolate all
“threats” to the racial status quo, real or imagined. In the end, however, the
work of these segregationists resulted in only a hollow victory. They had
hoped to get the white population both enraged and engaged in the “defense”
of segregation, but their actions, in fact, encouraged those same whites to
remain uninterested in segregationist organizations and uninvolved with their
activities. Assured that the state’s leadership had the problem well in hand,
they felt no need to join the grass-roots groups supporting the segregationist
cause. The States’ Rights Council of Georgia, for instance, had been
established as an avenue for marshalling the anger of segregationist whites
behind the massive resistance movement, but in the end it proved unable to
attract many members, or much interest, for that matter. And without a broad
political constituency behind it, massive resistance lost its relevance as a mass
movement.
II. ENFORCING CONFORMITY: THE GEORGIA COMMISSION ON EDUCATION
When he first heard about the Brown decision, Governor Herman
Talmadge was in the small town of Lafayette, Georgia. Just as the governor
was about to begin his stump speech—in a touch of irony, his topic that day
was the state’s successes with separate-but-equal education—a friend told him
that the Atlanta Journal had been frantically trying to reach him.2 “I
immediately knew what had happened,” Talmadge recalled. “Within minutes,
I had borrowed a DC-4, and in less than an hour I was back in Atlanta.”3 His
staff met him at the Governor’s Mansion with the latest wire releases on the
decision. As Talmadge prepared his statement, his aides frantically arranged a
press conference on the lawn of the Governor’s Mansion, bundling
microphones together with rubber bands, and hurrying to get the press in line.4
In spite of the rush, Talmadge seemed well-prepared. Speaking without notes,
the governor stared directly into rows of newsreel, television, and newspaper

2. FREDERICK ALLEN, ATLANTA RISING: THE INVENTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CITY
1946–1990 52-53 (1996); HERMAN E. TALMADGE WITH MARK ROYDEN WINCHELL,
TALMADGE: A POLITICAL LEGACY, A POLITICIAN’S LIFE 154-55 (1987).
3. TALMADGE & WINCHELL, supra note 2, at 155.
4. Telex Report, NEWSWEEK (May 17, 1954) (on file with Emory University, Atlanta,
Woodruff Library, Special Collections, Newsweek Atlanta Bureau Files, Box 16) [hereinafter
NAB].
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cameras, denouncing the ruling in no uncertain terms.5 “The court has thrown
down the gauntlet before those who believe the Constitution means what it
says when it reserves to the individual states the right to regulate their own
internal affairs,” Talmadge thundered.6 “Georgians accept the challenge and
will not tolerate the mixing of the races in the public schools or any of its
public tax-supported institutions.”7 His statement delivered, the governor
strode back into the mansion, sat down in an overstuffed maroon armchair, and
began taking calls from across the nation. He chatted with reporters for a
while, defending segregation strongly but with as much Southern charm as he
could muster. After a while, however, he tired of it all and told his wife to
inform future callers that the governor was busy inspecting the Confederate
troops outside.8
The press still found choice comments from other Georgian politicians,
who echoed the governor’s tone and temper. U.S. Senator Richard Russell, for
instance, released a stern statement denouncing the Court’s “flagrant abuse of
judicial power.”9 The Justices, he charged, had destroyed the rights “plainly
guaranteed” by the Constitution for states “to direct their most vital local
affairs.”10 Lieutenant Governor Marvin Griffin, then beginning a successful
gubernatorial campaign, seconded these sentiments. He lamented that “[t]he
meddlers, demagogues, race[-]baiters and Communists are determined to
destroy every vestige of states’ rights.”11 Under his administration, the future
governor promised the races would not be mixed, “come hell or high water.”12
A defiant Attorney General Eugene Cook, meanwhile, claimed the ruling did
not apply to Georgia and predicted that segregation would continue in the
state’s schools “until we are forced to abandon it by legal action applied to
every school unit in the state.”13
In spite of their professed shock, Georgia’s legislators had long anticipated
that the Supreme Court would make a ruling along the lines of the Brown
decision. At the start of the 1950s, for instance, Governor Talmadge realized
that the blatantly unequal distribution of school funding could bring the
charade of “separate but equal” education in Georgia to an ignominious end.

5. Interview by Harold Paulk Henderson with Herman Talmadge, Georgia Governor (June
26 and July 17, 1987) (transcript on file with Georgia State University, Atlanta, Georgia
Government Documentation Project) [hereinafter GGDP].
6. Talmadge Text, ATLANTA CONST., May 18, 1954, at 9.
7. Id.
8. ALLEN, supra note 2, at 53-54.
9. GILBERT C. FITE & RICHARD B. RUSSELL, JR., SENATOR FROM GEORGIA 331 (1991).
10. Id.
11. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68.
12. Id.
13. Ruling Doesn’t Apply to Georgia, Cook Says, Pledging Long Fight, ATLANTA CONST.,
May 18, 1954, at 1.
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Frantically, he tried to paper over the problem. In 1951, he pushed through a
sales tax to finance the Minimum Foundation Program for Education, which
equalized the pay of white and black teachers and provided other benefits for
black schools.14 A year later, he created a State School Building Authority to
sell bonds for new school construction across the state.15 In Atlanta, for
example, a new school bond called for the creation of eleven new black
schools—called “Supreme Court schools” because they had been hastily built
in anticipation of the likely desegregation decision.16 On paper, at least, such
steps narrowed the gap between white and black schooling. In 1940, for
instance, each black student received approximately thirty-one percent of what
each white student received in state funding; by 1952, the percentage had more
than doubled to sixty-eight percent.17 Such expenditures, however, did little to
make up for the incredible disparities in educational funding during the
previous half century. In any case, Georgia made it abundantly clear that it
was only making its schools “equal” to keep them “separate.” Both the state
constitution and the appropriations act stated that any school that served both
black and white students would be immediately stripped of its funding.18
As an added measure, Governor Talmadge proposed in November 1953 a
controversial constitutional amendment to grant the General Assembly the
power to privatize the state’s entire system of public education.19 In the event
of court-ordered desegregation, school buildings would be closed and students
would instead receive grants to attend private—and therefore still segregated—
schools.20 The “private school plan,” as it was commonly known, was openly
acknowledged to be a segregationist scheme.21 “We can maintain separate
schools regardless of the U.S. Supreme Court,” Talmadge promised, “by
reverting to a private system, subsidizing the child rather than the political

14. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 41-42.
15. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Sept. 3, 1954, at 5.
16. RONALD H. BAYOR, RACE AND THE SHAPING OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ATLANTA 219
(1996).
17. Georgia, supra note 15.
18. Id.; W. D. Workman, Jr., The Deep South, in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
SEGREGATION-DESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS 88, 92 (Don Shoemaker ed., 1957)
[hereinafter WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED].
19. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 54.
20. Id.
21. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Nov. 4, 1954, at 10. Indeed, many of the
plan’s supporters preferred to call it “the segregation amendment,” because they felt the stress on
“private schools” sounded elitist. Id.
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subdivision.”22 The General Assembly agreed, quickly passing the amendment
and arranging for its ratification on the next year’s ballot.23
To drum up public support for the private school plan, the state legislature
created the Georgia Commission on Education (“GCE” or “Commission”) in
January 1954.24 Officially, the GCE was established to “make plans for the
state to provide adequate education consistent with both the state and federal
constitutions.”25 In practice, however, the Commission acted solely to protect
segregated education in Georgia. Its membership included the state’s leading
advocates of massive resistance—not just politicians like Governor Talmadge,
Lieutenant Governor Griffin, Attorney General Cook, and Talmadge’s
appointees to state educational posts, but also private citizens, such as
constitutional expert Charles J. Bloch and noted campaign manager Roy V.
Harris.26 Durwood T. Pye, an Atlanta attorney, was chosen as Executive
Secretary.27 Like the other GCE members, Secretary Pye was a fervent
segregationist.28 Under Pye’s direction, the GCE led the public campaign for
passage of the “private school plan.”29 In the months before the November
1954 vote on the constitutional amendment, for instance, the Commission
spent $13,000 on mass mailings alone, using additional money for newspaper
ads.30 Individual members also spoke out for the amendment. Lieutenant
Governor Griffin, for example, hailed the measure as “a second Bill of Rights”
for the people of Georgia.31 The governor and attorney general also
campaigned actively, and the state Democratic Party sponsored television ads
in support of the amendment.32 When Georgians went to the polls, they passed
the proposal by a margin of 210,488 to 181,148.33 “I hope it will never
become necessary to use the amendment,” Governor Talmadge announced
22. Susan Margaret McGrath, Great Expectations: The History of School Desegregation in
Atlanta and Boston, 1954–1990, at 59 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University)
(on file with the James G. Kenan Research Center Archives, Atlanta History Center, Atlanta).
23. Georgia, supra note 15.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See GEORGIA COMMISSION ON EDUCATION, REPORT TO THE MEMBERS OF THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY BY THE GEORGIA COMMISSION ON EDUCATION, at i (1954) [hereinafter
EDUCATION REPORT].
27. Paul Douglas Bolster, Civil Rights Movements in Twentieth Century Georgia 136
(1972) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Georgia).
28. A contemporary remembered him as “a stern, formal, and fanatical man, whose wont it
was to sniff and twitch.” MORRIS B. ABRAM, THE DAY IS SHORT: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 97
(1982).
29. See Thomas O’Brien, Georgia’s Response to Brown v. Board of Education, 1954–1961,
in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SOUTH CAROLINA HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION (1992), at 56.
30. Bolster, supra note 27, at 136.
31. Georgia, supra note 21.
32. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 54.
33. Workman, supra note 18, at 98.
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after the vote, “but this should put the Supreme Court of the United States and
the people of this nation on notice that the people of Georgia are determined to
preserve segregation.”34
In addition to working for the passage of the private school plan, the GCE
made sure that a “true segregationist” would sit in the governor’s office after
Herman Talmadge’s term ended. During the summer of 1954, candidates
made formal appearances before the Commission to outline their plans for
preserving segregated schools.35 Spectators packed the Senate chamber of the
statehouse, along with cameras from both the local television stations and the
networks, to watch as competitors for the Democratic nomination sketched out
their plans.36 A lesser-known candidate offered a direct solution to the
desegregation decision—they should simply abolish the Supreme Court.37 But
the front-runners were no less inventive. Agricultural Commissioner Tom
Linder, for instance, proposed that officials canvass the state, asking parents to
swear under oath whether they wanted segregated or integrated schools for
their children.38 Those few who chose integrated schools, he explained, would
simply be turned over to a psychiatrist and promptly committed to the state’s
mental institution. They would have to be crazy.39 But Marvin Griffin stole
the show. The son of a Klansman, Griffin took great pains to appear as the
most dedicated segregationist in the election.40 He proudly proclaimed himself
“the white man’s candidate” and spent a good deal of time lashing out against
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP),
“Yankee carpetbaggers,” and other “meddlers” as he stumped across the
state.41 School officials, he told the Commission, should “hold the line” and
not “permit[] [the entry of] any Negro in white schools.”42 The races, he
repeated over and over again, would never be “mixed” during his
administration, “come hell or high water!”43 Not surprisingly, that fall, Griffin
swept into the governor’s office, guaranteeing that the “defense” of segregated
schools would continue at the highest levels of state government for another
four years.
34. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Dec. 1, 1954, at 8.
35. See BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68.
36. ATLANTA J., June 9, 1954.
37. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68.
38. Id. at 68-69.
39. Georgia, supra note 15; BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 69. See Bolster, supra note 27, at
137 n.9.
40. See Robert W. Dubay, Marvin Griffin and the Politics of the Stump, in GEORGIA
GOVERNORS IN AN AGE OF CHANGE: FROM ELLIS ARNALL TO GEORGE BUSBEE 101, 110-11
(Harold P. Henderson & Gary L. Roberts eds., 1988).
41. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Oct. 1, 1954, at 10.
42. Albert Riley, Attorneys Hint Board Favors Private School Plan for Segregation,
ATLANTA CONST., June 10, 1954, at 1.
43. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 68.
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During Griffin’s administration, the GCE continued to lead the state’s
defense of segregated education. When the legislature convened in January
1955, Durwood Pye placed the problem directly before them: “How may the
people of Georgia be protected against this decision?”44 The main means of
protection would be the private school plan, of course.45 Such a plan, Pye
claimed, only required money for tuition, buildings for classes, a little state
regulation, and a provision that the schools would be free from the interference
of the federal courts.46 But as added measures against desegregation, the GCE
authored a number of other proposals for the legislature’s approval. One
suggestion, for instance, was a bill to make it a felony—punishable by two
years imprisonment and a heavy fine—for any school official in the state to
spend tax money on “mixed” schools.47 It easily became law.48 Support in
Georgia’s House was so strong that the measure succeeded by a simple show
of hands, 105 to 2.49 Other proposals from Pye’s commission were routed onto
the legislative calendar to ensure that the assembly had enough opportunities to
rail against the Court’s ruling as the year wore on.50
Though Pye’s proposals were appreciated, the Georgia General Assembly
did not need any prodding. In the first month of its 1955 session alone, the
legislature demanded that public school teachers take oaths refusing to teach
“mixed classes,” considered a proposal to fine anyone taking part in integrated
sporting events, called for a federal constitutional amendment against the
integration of the armed forces, urged Congress to make states alone
responsible for matters of education, and tighten the requirements for Justices
of the Supreme Court.51 The most memorable measure of defiance, however,
was a simple one. In February 1956, the legislature changed the state flag,
replacing its three red and white stripes with the St. Andrew’s cross,
commonly known as “The Battle Flag of the Confederacy.”52 Legislators
claimed the change was simply a way to mark the upcoming centennial of the
Civil War.53 House leader Denmark Groover claimed the state needed to
“replace those meaningless stripes with something having deep meaning in the

44. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Feb. 3, 1955, at 6.
45. See EDUCATION REPORT, supra note 26, at 7-16.
46. Georgia, supra note 44.
47. Id.
48. See Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), March 3, 1955, at 7.
49. See id.
50. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 75.
51. Georgia, supra note 48. The teachers’ oath proposal remained tabled in committee
because many considered it a “superfluous” bill, given that the ban on spending tax money for
integrated schools was already on the books. See id.
52. John Walker Davis, An Air of Defiance: Georgia’s State Flag Change of 1956, 82 GA.
HIST. Q. 305, 317, 323 (1998).
53. See, e.g., id. at 322.
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hearts of all true Southerners.”54 (If the General Assembly truly sought to
honor the Confederacy, however, they should have left the original flag intact.
The “meaningless stripes” that Groover mocked were actually the “bars” from
the “Stars and Bars” flag of the Confederacy, which had, in turn, been
incorporated into the Georgia flag by State Senator Herman H. Perry, a
Confederate veteran who designed the state flag specifically as “a tribute to the
Confederate dead.”)55 In any case, despite the lip service paid to honoring the
Confederate dead in 1956, most Georgians recognized the flag change as a
declaration of war in a new battle to preserve segregation.56 “It will serve
notice” Groover acknowledged, “that we intend to uphold what we stood for,
will stand for, and will fight for.”57
The private school plan remained the heart of that fight. During the 1956
legislative session, the Georgia General Assembly strengthened the plan with a
number of new laws. The cornerstones—the governor’s power to close
“mixed” schools and offer tuition grants to individual students—were
reaffirmed.58 As added measures, the legislature laid out a plan for the transfer
of all public school property to private hands and ensured that all public school
teachers would still be covered by the state retirement program when they
started teaching at private institutions.59 Not a single detail was left untouched.
Procedures for fire marshal examinations of private schools, for instance, were
reworded and made to conform to the standards for public schools.60 If the
courts ordered their schools to desegregate, the governor could now switch
everything to a “private” system without missing a single beat.61
Even as they were preparing for the complete transfer of Georgia’s schools
from public to private hands, however, the legislature continued to deny that
the Supreme Court had any jurisdiction over those schools. Much like many
other Southern states, Georgia asserted the doctrines of interposition and
nullification—claiming, in essence, that a state could “interpose” its authority
between the federal government and local citizens and thereby declare
federally-made decisions “null and void” within the boundaries of the state.62
“[T]he State of Georgia has at no time surrendered to the General Government
54. Id. at 325.
55. Id. at 326.
56. See id. at 326-27.
57. Davis, supra note 52, at 327.
58. Segregation Measures, Interposition Are Adopted in Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville,
Tenn.), Mar. 1956, at 10 [hereinafter Segregation Measures].
59. Id.
60. See Georgia Lawmakers Take Action on 6 Private School Measures, S. SCH. NEWS
(Nashville, Tenn.), Feb. 1956, at 13 [hereinafter Georgia Lawmakers]; Segregation Measures,
supra note 58.
61. See Georgia Lawmakers, supra note 60.
62. See BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 127–28; ‘Interposition’ Weighed in Four States, S. SCH.
NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Jan. 1956, at 1.
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its rights to maintain racially separate public schools and other public
facilities,” a Georgia House resolution charged.63 “[I]t is clear that [the] Court
has deliberately resolved to disobey the Constitution of the United States, and
to flout and defy the Supreme Law of the Land.”64 The desegregation
decision, legislators argued, was therefore “null, void, and of no force or
effect.”65
The Georgia Senate supported the nullification resolution
unanimously, 39 to 0; the Georgia House passed it by a vote of 178 to 1.66
“You have moved decisively to let the whole nation know that Georgia will
stand firm for its traditions and ideals,” Governor Griffin noted, “come hell or
high water.”67 In case anyone missed the point, the legislature then resolved to
impeach the six still-sitting Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court who had
originally supported Brown and were, therefore, “guilty of attempting to
subvert the Constitution of the United States and of [committing] high crimes
and misdemeanors in office.”68
Not to be outdone, other state agencies pitched in with their own defense
of school segregation. In 1955, State Board of Education Chairman George P.
Whitman, Jr., another Talmadge appointee, announced that his board would
stand shoulder-to-shoulder with the legislature.69 “We do not plan, now or
ever,” he thundered, “to bend or to comply with the nine men of the U.S.
Supreme Court who have based their anti-segregation ruling on a volume
compiled by 16 men who are members of Communist front organizations.”70
Turning to other suspect texts, Whitman mounted a book-banning crusade
throughout Georgia’s schools.71 Any perceived insult to segregation or the
South became grounds to reject a book. Whitman threw out a reader in
American History, for instance, because it slighted the contributions of
Southern colonists in the Revolutionary War.72 Likewise, his board banned a
sociology textbook because it supposedly taught that whites were unfair to
blacks in elections.73 Such a statement, the board concluded, followed “the
NAACP line” and tried to “‘condition’ white children to the idea that color

63. Interposition and Nullification—Georgia, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 438, 438 (1956).
64. Id. at 440.
65. Id.; Interposition vs. Judicial Power: A Study of Ultimate Authority in Constitutional
Questions, 1 RACE REL. L. REP. 465, 466 (1956).
66. Segregation Measures, supra note 58.
67. Id.
68. Patrick E. McCauley, “Be It Enacted,” in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED:
SEGREGATION-DESEGREGATION IN SOUTHERN SCHOOLS 130, 131 (Don Shoemaker ed., 1957).
69. See Georgia Board Drops Teacher Ban, Leaves to Local Units, S. SCH. NEWS
(Nashville, Tenn.), Sept. 1955, at 16 [hereinafter Georgia Board].
70. See id.; McGrath, supra note 22, at 84-85.
71. JACK NELSON & GENE ROBERTS, JR., THE CENSORS AND THE SCHOOLS 175 (1963).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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doesn’t matter.”74 Whitman and his associates even found a student songbook,
Of Thee We Sing, to be offensive because its editors had changed a word in
Stephen Foster’s “Old Folks at Home.”75 Distraught at these and other
perceived outrages, the board decided to establish a more permanent textbook
committee that could “prevent ‘isms’ from creeping into our schools.”76 In the
end, the board created not one, but two, such committees.77 They examined all
literature in the Georgia school system for “anti-southern bias” and general
merit.78 Books deemed “un-Georgian” were removed from the stacks of
school libraries and put where they could do no harm.79 “There is no place in
Georgia schools at any time for anything that disagrees with out [sic] way of
life,” Whitman solemnly announced.80
By “anything,” George Whitman meant just that—even teachers. By this
time, Georgia’s educators were already obligated to take a number of oaths. In
1935, for instance, the legislature established a “Teachers’ Oath,” in which
educators promised to “refrain from directly or indirectly subscribing to or
teaching any theory of government or economics or of social relations which is
inconsistent with the fundamental principles of patriotism and high ideals of
Americanism.”81 This loyalty oath was buttressed in 1949 with another antisubversive oath for all state employees, and again in 1953 with the passage of a
“Security Questionnaire” in which teachers were asked about their
memberships in suspect groups.82 For segregationists who worried about
keeping the teachers in line, this array of loyalty oaths was still not enough.
Therefore, in August 1955, the State Board of Education adopted a resolution
“to revoke ‘forever’ the license of any teacher who ‘supports, encourages,
condones, or agrees to teach mixed classes.’”83 This, however, was seen as a
step too far. The Board came under fire from a variety of religious and legal
groups, and ultimately decided to retract the resolutions.84 But they kept in
place the earlier requirements that teachers sign oaths to “‘uphold, support and
74. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), June 8, 1955, at 18.
75. Georgia, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), May 4, 1955, at 3; see also NELSON &
ROBERTS, supra note 71, at 175. Instead of “Oh, darkies, how my heart grows weary,” the board
noted with disgust, the revised version read “Oh, brothers, how my heart grows weary.” See
Georgia, supra.
76. Georgia, supra note 74.
77. Georgians Ban ‘Forever’ Teachers of Mixed Groups; Strategy Mapped, S. SCH. NEWS
(Nashville, Tenn.), Aug. 1955, at 4 [hereinafter Georgians Ban ‘Forever’].
78. See generally Georgia, note 74.
79. See generally id.
80. Georgia, supra note 75.
81. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 218–19 (quoting Ga. Conference of the Am. Ass’n of Univ.
Professors v. Bd. of Regents, 246 F. Supp. 553, 554 (N.D. Ga. 1965)).
82. Id. at 219.
83. Georgians Ban ‘Forever’, supra note 77; see BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 219.
84. See Georgia Board, supra note 69.
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defend the constitution and laws’ of Georgia,” all of which, of course, called
for segregated schools.85
Though its licensing scheme failed, the State Board of Education remained
watchful of individual teachers who went against the grain of segregation. In
1956, for example, the Board tried to discontinue the retirement benefits for
Dr. Guy Wells, a well-known educator.86 At that time, Wells was serving as
director of the Georgia Committee on Interracial Cooperation.87 Many
segregationists complained that he was being a little too cooperative with other
races and demanded that he be punished.88 As Governor Griffin put it, for
someone who was drawing a monthly pension from the state, Wells was acting
“a little ugly.”89 Confronted by his critics, the educator denied any “radical”
activity.90 “I did deplore the passage of the so-called ‘private school’ laws
which most people believe are unconstitutional,” he wrote in response to the
attacks.91 “At no time did I recommend violence or extreme measures, but
suggested cooperation between the two groups to work out a satisfactory
solution.”92 That, it seemed, was still too much. Though the governor pushed
for the end of Wells’ pension package, the trustees of the fund refused.93
Undaunted, Griffin managed to convince the Regents of the University System
to strip the educator of his title as Emeritus President of the Georgia State
College for Women, solely because of his views on segregation.94
In a further attempt to chill all discussion of desegregation in the state, the
Georgia Commission on Education was granted new powers in early 1957.
The GCE now had the authority to hold hearings and subpoena witnesses.95
Furthermore, the Commission was granted a budget of $376,000 to spread the
word about the “Georgia way of life.”96 By this time, Durwood Pye had been
rewarded for his work on the Commission with an appointment to the Superior
Court of Fulton County, but his replacement as the GCE’s executive

85. Id.
86. Georgia Educator Loses Title Over Pro-Integration Views, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville,
Tenn.), Apr. 1956, at 7 [hereinafter Georgia Educator Loses Title].
87. Id.
88. See generally id.
89. Id.; see Bolster, supra note 27, at 181.
90. Letter from Guy H. Wells, Director, Georgia Committee on Interracial Cooperation, to
Eugene Cook, Georgia Attorney General (Feb. 25, 1956), microformed on Southern Regional
Council Microfilm Reel 19 (on file with Atlanta University Center, Atlanta, Woodruff Library,
Special Collections) [hereinafter SRC].
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Georgia Educator Loses Title, supra note 86.
94. Id.
95. See Georgia Legislature at Work on More Bills to Keep Segregation, S. SCH. NEWS
(Nashville, Tenn.), Feb. 1957, at 9; see also Bolster, supra note 27, at 139.
96. See Bolster, supra note 27, at 141.
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secretary—T. V. Williams, Jr.—was up to the challenge.97 Armed with a
“dreamy assortment of private-eye equipment,” including several thousand
dollars in telephone wiretaps, an assortment of pocket microphones, and “a
camera with a telescopic lens,” Williams set out to uproot the integrationist
conspiracy in the South.98 Money was apparently no object in his crusade.
According to a state audit, the Georgia Commission on Education spent more
than $100,000 during the 1957–58 fiscal year alone.99
The greatest success of Williams’ many investigations came on the Labor
Day weekend of 1957. A photographer on the state payroll, Ed Friend,
triumphantly announced that he had “made contact and infiltrated” a civil
rights conference at the Highlander Folk School in Monteagle, Tennessee.100
In truth, the conference was a public meeting open to everyone. Friend simply
showed up, asked to sit in, and proceeded to take pictures of folk singers and
workshop sessions.101 To commemorate the event, Highlander’s Director,
Myles Horton, asked the photographer to take a picture of the more notable
participants—Aubrey Williams, the former head of the National Youth
Administration, meeting chairman John Thompson, and Rosa Parks and the
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., both fresh from the bus boycott in
Montgomery.102 As soon as Friend could make it back to Atlanta with the
negatives, the GCE began churning out copies of the photograph in a pamphlet
titled Communist Training School.103 “The meeting of such a large group of
specialists in inter-racial strife under the auspices of a Communist Training
School, and in the company of many known Communists,” the GCE charged,
“is the typical method whereby leadership training and tactics are furnished to
the agitators.”104 The pamphlet became an instant success, and Friend’s
photograph soon appeared on billboards across the South.105 “I tell you,” Roy
Harris marveled later, “I think we published a million copies of that paper at
state expense.”106
97. See BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 182.
98. See Dubay, supra note 40, at 111; BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 223-24; Bolster, supra note
27, at 141.
99. Ardent Foe of Integration Winner in Governor’s Race, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.),
Oct. 1958, at 18.
100. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 182.
101. Id. at 182 n.55. See Press Release, Myles Horton (Oct. 5, 1957), microformed on SRC,
supra note 90, at Reel 20.
102. HOWELL RAINES, MY SOUL IS RESTED: THE STORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
IN THE DEEP SOUTH 397 (1983).
103. Bolster, supra note 27, at 142.
104. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 188-89.
105. See RAINES, supra note 102, at 398.
106. Id. at 395. According to notes from a Commission meeting in January 1958, the GCE
authorized Williams “to mail copies of the Highlander Folk School publicity to all box-holders in
Georgia.” See Memorandum from Harold Fleming to John Constable, Meeting of Georgia
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III. SILENCING PROTEST: GEORGIA’S CRUSADE AGAINST THE NAACP
Although Georgia’s segregationists delighted in “exposing” Martin Luther
King, Jr., their favorite target by far was the NAACP. There had been no love
lost between the state’s segregationists and the NAACP, known to the
segregationists as an organization of “outside meddlers” that led the fight
against school segregation. After the Brown ruling, however, this mutual
resentment escalated into open conflict.
The declaration of war came in October 1955, when Georgia’s Attorney
General, Eugene Cook, addressed the annual convention of the Peace Officers’
Association of Georgia. As the state’s top law enforcement officer, Cook
praised the troopers and city policemen for their role in “protecting the rights
and liberties of the people” against a host of threats.107 “It is because of your
demonstrated discernment in this regard that I have chosen this occasion as the
proper forum for revealing, for the first time, the authenticated details of the
most ominous of these threats to arise during our lifetime,” the Attorney
General announced with a great deal of gravity.108 “I refer to the subversive
designs behind the current crusade of the misnamed National Association for
the Advancement of Colored People and its fellow-traveling fronts to force
upon the South the Communist-inspired doctrine of racial integration and
amalgamation.”109 He then rattled off a list of “citations” of un-American
activities against individuals associated with the NAACP.110 “[E]ither
knowingly or unwittingly,” Cook concluded, “[the NAACP] has allowed itself
to become part and parcel of the Communist conspiracy to overthrow the
democratic governments of this nation and its sovereign states.”111 “The Ugly
Truth About the NAACP,” as the speech was thereafter known, became a holy
text for segregationists throughout Georgia, the South, and the nation.
Attorney General Cook distributed copies from his office, and gladly allowed
other segregationist groups to reprint the speech themselves.112 The National
Citizens Protective Association, based in St. Louis, Missouri included Cook’s
speech on a list of “Crusading Literature for White Americans” available by

Commission on Education (Jan. 10, 1958), microformed on SRC, supra note 90, at Reel 20, Part
692.
107. Eugene Cook, Georgia Attorney General, The Ugly Truth About the NAACP (Oct. 19,
1955) (transcript microformed on SRC, supra note 90, at Reel 50).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Weldon James, The South’s Own Civil War, in WITH ALL DELIBERATE SPEED, supra
note 18, at 15, 20.
111. Id.
112. See id.
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mail. Likewise, the Patriots of North Carolina, an organization akin to the
Citizens’ Councils, reprinted the speech for its members.113
Cook’s charges that the NAACP was a radical, dangerous organization
only confirmed what most whites already believed. “In the white Southern
mind the NAACP is very definitely an enemy organization,” noted a
Newsweek reporter from Atlanta.114 “Politicians have equated [the NAACP]
with the Klan and Citizens Councils as being extremist; most Southerners
would see the Association as being more extreme than the Councils and,
possibly, less extreme than the Klan.”115
Even whites who held no sympathy for segregationist groups regarded the
NAACP with a special suspicion. “I don’t believe in Ku Klux Klan, Black
Shirts or National Association for the Advancement of the Communist Party,”
one man complained.116 “The latter is the worst of all, for they use the Colored
people as dupes just to carry out their dirty points, then the poor Negro can go
jump in a lake.”117 “Can’t something be done to stop the NAACP?,” asked a
typical letter.118 “It seems to me we have more to fear from them than we do
from the Russians. If something isn’t done to stop the negroes they are in the
not too distant future going to run this country and the white people will be the
ones looked down upon.”119 Other white Georgians agreed. “I think it is high
time for us to be up and doing something to resist the diabolical efforts of
NAACP and other subversive influences,” an angry man wrote, “instead of just
letting things drift, and thereby inviting future generations to rise up and curse
the day that gave us birth for not doing something about it.”120
The politicians in the state capital, however, needed little prodding. In
January, 1956, Attorney General Cook officially launched the state’s
counterattack against the NAACP.121 “I want to assure you that the people of
Georgia are completely fed up,” he privately told the Attorneys General from

113. Mailing from States Rights’ Council of Georgia, (Oct. 9, 1956), microformed on Papers
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People Microfilm Edition Group III,
Series A, Part 20 (on file with Atlanta University, Atlanta, Woodruff Library, Special Collections,
Atlanta Urban League Papers, Box 24) [hereinafter NAACP].
114. Telex Report, NEWSWEEK (Oct. 5, 1957) (on file with NAB, supra note 4, at Box 10).
115. Id.
116. Letter from E.A. Ville to Ralph McGill (Sept. 1957) (on file with Emory University,
Atlanta, Woodruff Library, Special Collections, Ralph McGill Papers, Box 24).
117. Id.
118. Letter from Mrs. C. H. Epps to Representative James C. Davis (Mar. 10, 1959) (on file
with Emory University, Atlanta, Woodruff Library, Special Collections, General Correspondence
Series, James C. Davis Papers, Box 37) [hereinafter JCD].
119. Id.
120. Letter from R. E. Douglas to Charles L. Cox (Oct. 9, 1956) (on file with JCD, supra note
118, at Box 31).
121. See Letter from Eugene Cook to Southern Attorneys General (Jan. 10, 1956) (on file
with JCD, supra note 118, at Box 31).
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other southern states, “and are determined to make the NAACP and its allied
organizations fight for every inch they gain in their efforts to destroy State
sovereignty and to bring about a mulatto race.”122 Publicly, Cook enlisted the
support of the Georgia legislature to help him fight the NAACP’s
“ruthless . . . drive . . . to destroy constitutional government and our traditional
pattern of racial segregation.”123 Though he hoped to have the organization
outlawed completely, Cook was willing just to cripple it.124 To hamstring the
legal staff of the NAACP, for instance, Cook pushed through new laws that
redefined and constricted the old common law offenses of barratry, champerty,
and maintenance.125
The segregationists at the state capital found even greater opportunities in
their war against the NAACP. When the Alabama legislature effectively
outlawed the organization in 1956, the NAACP relocated its Southern
Regional Office to Atlanta.126 NAACP Regional Director Ruby Hurley,
realizing that Georgia’s segregationists would welcome her associates about as
warmly as Alabama’s had, wisely decided to ship all of the important records
to New York for safekeeping.127 Just as she feared, two weeks after the
Atlanta office opened, Georgia tried to seize the group’s regional membership
lists.128 T. V. Williams, the State Revenue Commissioner and, importantly,
father of the Georgia Commission on Education’s T. V. Williams, Jr.,
demanded that the non-profit group turn over its records to show why it had
failed to pay any state taxes.129 Instead of filing the letter through normal
channels, Williams displayed the same flair for dramatics as his son. Two of
his agents surprised Hurley at her home in November 1956 and presented her
with their demands.130 They then accompanied her to the office, where another

122. Id.
123. Bolster, supra note 27, at 179.
124. Id.
125. Barratry was commonly defined as the “habitual stirring up of quarrels and suits.”
Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks: The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371, 374
(1959). Champerty referred to the actions of someone with no legitimate interest in a lawsuit
who assists one of the parties “in return for a share of the expected proceeds of the case.” Id.
More broadly defined, maintenance covered “officious intermeddling in a suit which in no way
belongs to one, by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise, to prosecute or
defend it.” Id.
126. Bolster, supra note 27, at 181.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Georgia Governor Weighs ‘Segregation Strategy’ Meet for South, S. SCH. NEWS
(Nashville, Tenn.), Dec. 1956, at 10; Letter from T. V. Williams, Georgia Revenue
Commissioner, to Ruby Hurley, Southern Regional Director, NAACP (Nov. 20, 1956),
microformed on NAACP, supra note 113, at Group III, Series A, Part 20.
130. Ruby Hurley, Georgia Move Against NAACP (Nov. 1956), microformed on NAACP,
supra note 113, at Group III, Series A, Part 20.
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eight men and an assistant attorney general stormed the room “in a manner
suggesting the hunt for a criminal.”131 Though she maintained a watchful eye
on the proceedings, Hurley allowed the agents to look through her office’s files
and take notes, knowing that much of the information they sought was already
gone.132
Still looking for the membership lists, Williams’ agents decided to search
the separate Atlanta branch office. Unlike Hurley, local branch president John
Calhoun did not want the agents to have free rein with his papers. “I do not
object to the financial records,” he wrote, “but I hate the idea of their
‘rummaging’ through our files, picking up things that can later be twisted to
their purposes.”133 Unsure of what to do, Calhoun stalled for time, hoping to
contact the national headquarters or, at the very least, speak with his lawyer.
Williams refused to grant him any reprieve, however, and instead strode down
to the Fulton County courthouse to file for contempt charges against Calhoun
and the other officers of the local NAACP.134 In what was either an amazing
coincidence or a prearranged plot, the presiding judge turned out to be none
other than Durwood T. Pye, the man who had only recently been replaced by
Williams’ son as head of the GCE.
The NAACP was not impressed by the supposed coincidence. Citing the
judge’s “repeated denounciations [sic] of the colored race in general and these
defendants in particular,” they claimed Pye could not try the case impartially
and therefore should recuse himself.135 The man who at one time led
Georgia’s segregationist resistance professed to be “amazed” by the
allegations.136 “I have never denounced the colored race,” he told the
courtroom.137 “I have strong views with respect to the identity of the races and
the preservation of their separate and individual accomplishments. The Court
has strong personal views against a mongrelization of the races.”138 The
motion was denied.139 After a six-day trial, Judge Pye made his supposed
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Letter from John Calhoun, Local NAACP Branch President, to Henry Lee Moon,
Director of Publicity, NAACP (Dec. 16, 1956), microformed on NAACP, supra note 113, at
Group III, Series A, Part 20.
134. Along with John Calhoun and Ruby Hurley, four other officers of the Atlanta branch
were brought up on contempt charges: L. D. Milton, Eunice Cooper, V. W. Hodges, and D.L.
Hollowell. See NAACP, Press Release, Georgia Fine, Jail Sentence Denounced as “Vindictive”
(Dec. 14, 1956), microformed on NAACP, supra note 113, at Group III, Series A, Part 20.
135. Plaintiff’s Motion, Williams v. NAACP, (No. A-58654), Fulton County Super. Ct.,
microformed on NAACP, supra note 113, at Group V, Series B, Part 23.
136. Transcript of Proceedings, Williams v. NAACP (No. A-58654), Fulton County Super.
Ct., microformed on NAACP, supra note 113, at Group V, Series B, Part 23.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
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impartiality clear. He levied a $25,000 fine against the Atlanta branch of the
NAACP for contempt.140 As an added measure, he refused to certify the trial
records, effectively stalling any appeal of the fine.141 Meanwhile, T. V.
Williams piled it on, using Judge Pye’s predictable ruling to hit the non-profit
group with an additional assessment of more than $17,000 for eleven years of
unpaid income taxes.142
In a more personal attack, Judge Pye leaned on John Calhoun. He ordered
the branch president imprisoned until he agreed to turn all of the requested files
over to the state.143 After a night in jail, Calhoun grudgingly gave in.144 Tired
of all “this cloak and dagger stuff,” he granted the agents access to his
office.145 But, Pye was still not done with him. The judge released Calhoun
on the contempt charge, yet kept the threat of imprisonment over his head for
years afterward. He had sentenced the NAACP leader to twelve months
incarceration at the trial, generously agreeing to suspend the sentence “so long
as he behaves himself.”146 For years thereafter, Calhoun lived with that threat.
When an NAACP attorney appeared before Pye in another case, he asked the
judge to lift the probation.147 Pye refused: “I am not ready to release him.”148
Apparently, he never was. The probationary threat was still in place when Pye
died.149
The NAACP tried to remain defiant in the face of Georgia’s massive
campaign of propaganda and harassment. “You can’t kill, outlaw or legislate
away the desire of a people to be free,” the Reverend L. H. Pitts of Atlanta

140. Question of Academic Qualifications Raised in Georgia University Suit, S. SCH. NEWS
(Nashville, Tenn.), Jan. 1957, at 16 [hereinafter Question of Academic Qualifications].
141. Murphy, supra note 125, at 378; U.S. Court in Georgia Refuses to Kill Suit by College
Applicants, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), July 1957, at 9 [hereinafter U.S. Court in Georgia].
Pye refused to certify the bill of exceptions, thereby preventing the court record from leaving his
jurisdiction for review by the appeals courts. In an NAACP suit directed against Pye, the Georgia
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial judge had every right to hold the record until it met with his
approval. See NAACP v. Pye, 101 S.E.2d 609, 611 (Ga. Ct. App. 1957). A copy of case
materials and related correspondence is available at NAACP, supra note 113, at Group V, Series
B, Part 23. For years afterward, Judge Pye repeatedly refused to reconsider or reduce the fine.
See, e.g., Judge Pye Rejects Pleas by NAACP, ATLANTA CONST., March 8, 1960, at 13; Review of
NAACP’s Fine Here Denied, ATLANTA CONST., June 2, 1959, at 1.
142. U.S. Court in Georgia, supra note 141.
143. Bruce Galphin, NAACP Yields Records After $25,000 Contempt Fine, Jailing of Leader,
ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 15, 1956, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Id.; NAACP, Press Release (Dec. 14, 1956), microformed on NAACP, supra note 113,
at Group II, Series A, Part 20.
146. Order, Williams v. NAACP (No. A-58654), Fulton County Super. Ct., microformed on
NAACP, supra note 113, at Group V, Series B, Part 23.
147. McGrath, supra note 22, at 101.
148. Id.
149. Id.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1026

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 48:1009

announced in early 1957.150 “A year from now, it may be illegal to carry a
NAACP membership card in your wallet, but you can carry it in your heart.”151
In spite of this sentiment, Georgia’s campaign of intimidation did take a sharp
toll on the NAACP. Membership dropped steadily in the years after 1957 and
the organization’s public functions suffered as a result.152 The state conference
in 1959, for instance, was widely acknowledged to be the “worst in years.”153
A mere twenty-seven adults registered.154 As NAACP State Secretary Amos
Holmes noted glumly, “no real interest was evident anywhere.”155 Ruby
Hurley agreed. In 1960, she warned that “the situation is serious,” with
membership down, state contributions at a midyear total of just more than
$700, and a number of the local chapters being abandoned for lack of
activity.156
Georgia’s political campaign of massive resistance had been exhaustive
and, for its targets, exhausting. In the half-decade after the Brown ruling,
Governors Talmadge and Griffin had erected an intricate defense of segregated
education centered on the “private school plan.” Should the courts dare order
the desegregation of Georgia’s public schools, the state would simply rid itself
of them. The legislature surrounded this self-destruct mechanism with a host
of other laws that strengthened segregation and discouraged any deviation
from the norm. State officials at every level harassed and hampered the
opposition, silencing all dissent and strongly encouraging white Georgians to
conform to a common denominator of white supremacy. In spite of its
apparent successes, however, this rather breathtaking campaign of massive
resistance had essentially failed in one of its principal missions—uniting
segregationist opposition at the grass-roots level. As the example of the States’
Rights Council of Georgia makes clear, whatever their feelings were about
segregation and desegregation in the state, ordinary white Georgians
essentially sat this fight out.
IV. FAILING TO ORGANIZE: THE STATES’ RIGHTS COUNCIL OF GEORGIA
As Georgia’s politicians worked to make the state’s white citizens conform
to their political views and silence all dissent from white liberals and black
activists, they assumed that another organization—the States’ Rights Council
of Georgia (“States’ Rights Council” or “Council”)—would organize ordinary
white segregationists and mobilize them in a grass-roots defense of white

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.

Questions of Academic Qualifications, supra note 140.
Id.
Bolster, supra note 27, at 184.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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supremacy. Committed to using “every legal means” for “the preservation of
the social, political, and economic institutions of our beloved Southland,” the
Council was led by some of the state’s segregationist giants.157 The first
chapter, in Augusta, had been established in December 1954 by two leading
figures in Georgia’s political scene—Roy V. Harris, the four-time Speaker of
Georgia’s House and perhaps the most successful political operative in the
state, and Hugh G. Grant, a diplomat who had served as Franklin D.
Roosevelt’s minister to Albania and Thailand.158 In spite of their prestige,
however, the Council found only a small following in Augusta and even less
success. Its greatest triumph, for instance, came when it forced the
cancellation of the city’s Thirteenth Annual Soap Box Derby in July 1955
because a pair of black boys had dared to enter the competition.159
However, the States’ Rights Council gained new strength and scope when
the rest of Georgia’s political establishment stepped in. In September 1955,
Governor Griffin assembled two hundred of the state’s most prominent
political and business leaders for a strategy session at Atlanta’s Biltmore
Hotel.160 Speakers included former Governor Herman Talmadge, Lieutenant
Governor Ernest Vandiver, and two of the state’s top legal minds, R. Carter
Pittman, a well-known constitutional lawyer, and Charles J. Bloch, past
president of the Georgia Bar Association and the then-current chairman of the
education committee of the Board of Regents of the University System of
Georgia.161 “The NAACP and every other left-wing group is organized,”
Governor Griffin warned the dignitaries, “and it’s time for those of us who
believe in Georgia’s traditional way of life to do some organizing.”162 The
States’ Rights Council of Georgia, as the group would thereafter be known,
would reach out across the state to consolidate segregationist sentiment at the
grass-roots level, Griffin promised.163 With many of the Council’s members
active as officers in state government and as officials with the Georgia
Commission on Education, segregationists now believed that they presented a
unified front of massive resistance.164

157. NEIL R. MCMILLEN, THE CITIZENS’ COUNCIL: ORGANIZED RESISTANCE TO THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, 1954–64, at 81 (1971).
158. Id.
159. BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 101–02; MCMILLEN, supra note 157, at 81.
160. Southern Regional Council, Pro-Segregation Groups in the South (May 23, 1957),
microformed on SRC, supra note 90 [hereinafter Pro-Segregation Groups]; see FRANCIS M.
WILHOIT, THE POLITICS OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE 115 (1973).
161. MCMILLEN, supra note 157, at 82.
162. McGrath, supra note 22, at 67.
163. See id.
164. See BARTLEY, supra note 1, at 102.
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The assembly selected Carter Pittman as president of the States’ Rights
Council of Georgia.165 An outspoken segregationist and staunch antiCommunist, the attorney had already made a name for himself speaking out
against the “non-legal, illegal and inadmissible sociological materials to
sustain judicial legislation based on false Marxist propaganda secretly supplied
to the [Warren Court] by [the] NAACP.”166 The articles he authored—with
telling titles like All Men Are Not Equal and The Supreme Court, the Broken
Constitution, and the Shattered Bill of Rights—were widely circulated in the
more literate segregationist circles.167 In his writings and public appearances,
Pittman’s command of constitutional history was matched only by his
complete disdain for the Warren Court and its desegregation decision. (His
article The Law of the Land, for instance, drew on four hundred years of
English and American legal thought to discredit the authority of the United
States Supreme Court. His final words, however, were a simple invocation of
John Wilkes Booth: “‘Sic semper tyrannis.’”)168 Time and again, Pittman
insisted that segregation was not a problem. It was, instead, the solution. “The
South has no racial problem and has had none for a half century,” he told the
Georgia Institute of City and County Attorneys a few weeks after his
appointment. “Its racial problems were solved by segregation.”169
Under Pittman’s leadership, the Council set up offices in downtown
Atlanta that fall, hiring a full-time clerical staff and appointing an executive
director to oversee its statewide crusade.170 For that post, the Council relied on
the Reverend William T. Bodenhamer, a Baptist minister, representative in the
General Assembly, and member of the State Board of Education who had
served as a principal, superintendent, and president of a junior college.171
Bodenhamer’s credentials did not stop there. He was an active civic leader,
holding memberships with the Rotarians, the Civitans, the Shriners, the
Knights Templar, and the Sons of Confederate Veterans, and was a thirty-

165. Id.
166. Integration Ruling Laid to Deception, ATLANTA CONST., October 22, 1955, at 12; see
also MCMILLEN, supra note 157, at 83.
167. Copies of both can be found on NAACP, supra note 113, at Group III, Series A, Part 20.
168. R. Carter Pittman, The Law of the Land, 6 J. PUB. L. 444, 454 (1957). A reprint can be
found on NAACP, supra note 113, at Group III, Series A, Part 20.
169. Integration Ruling Laid to Deception, supra note 168; Georgia Official Says NAACP
‘Subversive;’ Charges Denied, S. SCH. NEWS (Nashville, Tenn.), Nov. 1955, at 16. Pittman
served as president of the States’ Rights Council of Georgia until 1958, when he began devoting
his efforts to other right-wing groups such as the Liberty Lobby, the John Birch Society, and Billy
Hargis’s Christian Crusade. See MCMILLEN, supra note 157, at 83–84.
170. MCMILLEN, supra note 157, at 84.
171. Id.; Pro-Segregation Groups, supra note 160; see also Typewritten Manuscript, Citizens
Council Activity Report (1956) (on file with Atlanta University, Atlanta, Woodruff Library,
Special Collections, Atlanta Urban League Papers, Box 24).
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second degree Mason as well.172 With ties to virtually every group in Georgia,
he seemed eminently qualified for the task of setting up local chapters of the
States’ Rights Council in each of Georgia’s one hundred-fifty-nine counties
and boosting the total membership to the goal of 150,000.173
In spite of the credentials of Pittman and Bodenhamer and the support of
the entire state establishment, the Council actually accomplished very little. In
fact, its first foray in defense of segregation brought the organization nothing
but embarrassment. In late November 1955, the football team at Georgia Tech
accepted an invitation to play against the University of Pittsburgh in the Sugar
Bowl.174 Tech had a strong football tradition, counting past legend John
Heisman and present leader Bobby Dodd among its revered coaches.175 At the
time of the Sugar Bowl offer, the Tech squad was at the peak of its 1950s
power and popularity, having won six bowl bids in a row.176 But, with this
latest invitation, there was a problem. The University of Pittsburgh had a
single black player, a reserve fullback.177 The executive committee of the
States’ Rights Council fired off a concerned telegram to Georgia Tech Coach
Bobby Dodd, urging him to prevent “any breakdown of our laws, customs, and
traditions of racial segregation.”178 Governor Griffin, always ready to steal the
segregationist spotlight, soon joined in. “The South stands at Armageddon,”
the governor dramatically announced. He stated:
We cannot make the slightest concession to the enemy in this dark and
lamental [sic] hour of struggle. There is no difference in compromising
integrity of race on the playing field than in doing so in the classrooms. One
break in the dike and the relentless seas will rush in and destroy us.179

The Sugar Bowl bid, the governor said, would have to be canceled.180
To Griffin’s surprise, Georgia Tech’s students were outraged. That night,
they hung effigies of the governor from trees on campus and then took to the
streets of Atlanta in protest.181 With signs saying “Impeach Griffin” and “To
Hell with Griffin,” more than two thousand students stormed the State Capitol,
scuffling with guards and agents of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation and

172. MCMILLEN, supra note 157, at 84.
173. Pro-Segregation Groups, supra note 160.
174. Robert W. Dubay, Politics, Pigmentation, and Pigskin: The Georgia Tech Sugar Bowl
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causing a good bit of damage in the process.182 Meanwhile, another five
hundred showed up outside the governor’s mansion, tearing up parking meters
and tossing trash cans down the street.183 As the Atlanta Fire Department
stood by with canisters of tear gas, a wall of city policemen formed a barricade
in front of the mansion.184 Some students tried to break through the lines and
reach Griffin, only to be dragged away by the police.185 In the end, a fullblown riot was only averted because State Representative Milton M. “Muggsy”
Smith, a former Georgia Tech player himself, showed up and calmed the
crowd down.186 In the end, Griffin and his allies backed down and allowed the
game to go ahead as originally planned.187 Segregation might be a revered
Southern tradition, they realized, but it was no match for college football.
Hoping to recover from the Sugar Bowl embarrassment, the States’ Rights
Council began holding rallies across Georgia. In January 1956, the campaign
got off to an auspicious start with a membership drive in Americus, a county
seat with a population of roughly 11,000.188 In an impressive show of support,
Herman Talmadge, Marvin Griffin, Eugene Cook, Ernest Vandiver, Roy
Harris, and R. Carter Pittman were all present to shake hands and recruit new
members.189 Speaking to the crowd, Governor Griffin called for the
establishment of Council chapters in every town.190 “The rest of the nation,”
he stated, “is looking to Georgia for the lead in segregation.”191 Talmadge,
who was then about to begin his successful quest for the United States Senate,
declared the rally “the beginning of a great crusade which will sweep the state
and southern regions.”192 In the weeks thereafter, Bodenhamer and Pittman
crisscrossed the state, trying to sell memberships and set up chapters of the
segregationist group.193 Bodenhamer boasted of personally holding twentyeight different rallies in the month of March alone.194 In spite of these efforts,
the results were disappointing. By mid-summer, there were less than a dozen
chapters linked to the Atlanta headquarters.195
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In an effort to drum up support, the Council then blanketed the state with
propaganda. “WHITE AMERICAN CITIZENS UNDER ATTACK!” warned
one piece.196 “The Supreme Court on May 17, 1954, declared that racial
segregation in the public schools of the nation is unconstitutional. THIS IS
REVOLUTION!”197 The only solution, the pamphlet continued, was to
“ORGANIZE: There is a job to be done. Don’t be lulled into complacency by
the soothing talk of ‘Gradual’ race integration. There must never be ANY
racial integration.”198 While whites across Georgia generally agreed with such
sentiments, they still felt no need to join the Council. After organizers totaled
up the membership lists in 1958, they were stunned by how little had been
accomplished in more than three years of campaigning. “Total number of
members in the active file is 2,450 for [the] entire state,” an official noted
dejectedly.199 “If only those members who have paid their dues for 1958 were
counted, they would not exceed 500.”200 For an organization that had assumed
it could quickly and easily reach a total membership of 150,000,201 these
figures were startling, to say the least.
Publicly, leaders of the massive resistance movement attributed the weak
membership in the Council to a vast left-wing conspiracy against segregation.
Atlanta’s Congressman James C. Davis led the attack. At a Council meeting at
the Atlanta Athletic Club, he thundered:
The left-wing press, left-wing columnists and writers, the left-wing
commentators on television and radio, together with all of the left-wing
organizations in the country beginning with the Communists and ending with
organizations that are merely crackpot, are staging a massive campaign of
super-brain-washing propaganda having a two-fold purpose.202

“These purposes are, first, to sell law-abiding American people the false
idea that no one has the right to question a pronouncement of the Supreme
Court, and second, that those who have any pride of race are bigoted,
prejudiced, narrow-minded racists and hate-mongers.”203 Congressman Davis
then went on to dispel the notion that he himself was a “narrow-minded racist”
by detailing the “obvious and well-known differences between whites and
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blacks which no amount of glossing over and covering up by subversive socalled ‘anthropologists’ and pseudo-scientists can hide.” He said that the
differences included the uncleanliness, mental inferiority, and natural
criminality of blacks.204
In spite of such public pronouncements, Council officials privately
admitted that their problems were internal ones. First, they had made a fatal
step in selecting Reverend William T. Bodenhamer as head of the recruitment
drive. “Our director was a member of the Legislature, a minister, and a
member of the State School Board,” Carter Pittman complained.205 “In my
opinion he did not average more than twelve hours a week in our Atlanta office
and when he spent that time in our office, he was doing nothing toward serving
our membership.”206 If anything, the minister from Ty Ty proved to be a
tremendous drain on the office, using its funds for his own pet projects and
personal needs.207 (“When I learned that he installed a dictaphone in his car at
the expense of the Council,” Pittman told an associate, “I nearly had a heart
attack.”)208 A complete failure, Bodenhamer was forced out in early 1958.209
The Council tried to begin again, but the task seemed daunting. Pittman
complained to Bodenhamer’s replacement, “we are exactly where we were in
the spring of 1955, we must start from there.”210
However, more important than these personnel problems of the Council
were its political problems. From its founding, the Council had been used by
politicians solely as a sounding board for their own campaigns. With all of
their effort spent puffing up their segregationist credentials before the voters,
the Council leaders devoted little time to actual grass-roots organization.211
After a few years, Hugh Grant had to admit that his Council had become “a
political rather than a grass roots organization.”212 In case anyone missed that
distinction, Bill Bodenhamer soon managed to make it perfectly clear.
Immediately after being forced out of the organization, the minister launched a
campaign for the governor’s office, claiming that he alone was qualified to
204. Id. Congressman Davis was long remembered by contemporaries as the embodiment of
the far political right. “He was extremely a right-winger, we call them now,” Judge Osgood
Williams remembered. “Back in those days, I think we called them horses’ asses, but he was
certainly a right-winger.” Interview by Cliff Kuhn with Judge Osgood Williams (May 12, 1998)
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prevent the desegregation of Georgia’s schools.213 Absurdly, he claimed his
main rival, Lieutenant Governor Ernest Vandiver, was somehow “‘soft’ on
segregation.”214 To the contrary, Vandiver had asserted that “there is not
enough money in the federal treasury nor enough federal troops to force us to
mix the races in the classrooms of the schools and colleges of Georgia while I
am your governor.”215 “You and I say to the United States Supreme Court,”
Vandiver shouted to applauding crowds, “that we will resist this tyranny at
every crossroads, at every filling station, in every hamlet, in every militia
district, in every town, in every city and in every county throughout the length
and breadth of the State of Georgia until sanity is restored in the land.”216 In
light of such statements, Bodenhamer’s charges that Vandiver was the
“NAACP’s candidate” simply fell flat.217 In fact, his charges backfired.218 As
voters compared Bodenhamer’s rhetoric with his record, they were less than
impressed. Segregationists across the state publicly blamed him for the failure
of the States’ Rights Council.219 “The preacher candidate,” Roy Harris
charged, “sabotaged it by simply failing to do his duty. He did as little of
nothing as a man could do when he held the office of Executive Director of the
council.”220 While Bodenhamer should have been organizing the state’s
resistance network, Harris noted, he instead “used the office in Atlanta for his
own personal and political benefit.”221 The Bodenhamer campaign was
crippled by the counterattack, and Ernest Vandiver won the election in a
landslide.222 He carried one hundred-fifty-six of one hundred-fifty-nine
counties, beating the preacher by a margin of more than four-to-one in the
popular vote.223
As it turned out, the defeat of Bill Bodenhamer also marked the downfall
of the States’ Rights Council. After the factionalism of the 1958 campaign, the
Council seemed more than ever to be simply a sounding board for
segregationist politicians and their speechwriters. Not even the rise of an
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established, behind-the-scenes, segregationist like Roy Harris to its presidency
changed that problem. Speaking out against the Council’s political inclinations
in 1960, Hugh Grant charged that Harris, with whom he had founded the first
States’ Rights Council six years earlier, had only given “lip service to the
organization of the rank and file.”224 With no foundation of grass-roots
support below and an abundance of political factionalism above, the
organization simply withered away. In 1962, the States’ Rights Council of
Georgia—at one time seen as the greatest hope for a statewide defense of
segregation—finally collapsed.225
At the same time, the infighting of the 1958 campaign also served to
cripple the Council’s unofficial counterpart, the Georgia Commission on
Education.226 In July 1958, Harvey H. Chandler, the assistant executive
secretary of the GCE, resigned, charging that T. V. Williams, Jr. had turned the
office into a publicity center for the Bodenhamer campaign.227 Chandler
claimed that GCE personnel had sent out 500,000 pieces of “false, scurrilous,
malicious, doctored and defamatory pictures and literature” aimed at Ernest
Vandiver’s defeat.228 Under intense pressure, Williams resigned and the GCE
quickly fell from its former position of prominence.229 Not surprisingly, after
his election, Governor Vandiver disbanded the Commission.230 He replaced it
with a new agency, the Governor’s Commission on Constitutional
Government, but this organization quickly faded from view as well.231
The collapse of the Georgia Commission on Education and the States’
Rights Council of Georgia meant that the segregationist politicians at the top of
the state’s massive resistance movement no longer had even the pretense of
organizational support underneath them. To be sure, the vast majority of
whites supported their “defense” of segregation and kept returning them to
office on that basis. However, aside from giving them their votes, these whites
were little involved in the practical campaign against desegregation. When
court-ordered desegregation finally struck the state in 1961—at both the
University of Georgia in Athens and the public high schools of Atlanta232—
political posturing could do little to stop it. Ordinary segregationist whites
watched in disbelief as the state’s capital and flagship university “fell” to the
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forces of integration.233 As they were lost, so too was the cause of massive
resistance.
V. CONCLUSION
From the beginning, the forces behind the political movement known as
“massive resistance” had assumed that the key to maintaining white supremacy
in the South was to first ensure white solidarity. However, instead of
encouraging a grass-roots effort to mobilize rank-and-file segregationists in
support of the larger cause, these politicians decided to pursue a top-down
approach in which they told ordinary white Southerners how to act, while
never giving them reasons or inspiration to mobilize themselves. These
average segregationists had been assured all along that the state and regional
campaigns of political massive resistance would hold the civil rights
movement at bay, and they had thus given little thought about their own role in
resistance until it was too late.
This account of the political failures of the massive resistance movement is
not meant to imply that Southern whites offered no resistance to the civil rights
movement. They did, of course. As activists in the civil rights movement
pursued their campaigns of non-violent direct action in countless communities
across the South, whites often reacted to their struggle with reprisals of
intimidation, violence, and oppression. As brutal and often bloody as that
strand of white resistance was, it essentially represented a localized reaction
that was both unplanned and uncoordinated at either the state or regional level.
As such, that kind of white resistance to civil rights change proved to be a
much more chaotic and, ultimately, a much more ineffective “defense” of
segregation than the coordinated campaign of “massive resistance” that had
originally been plotted by the region’s political leaders.
In spite of their grand plans, massive resistance had essentially remained
an operation of politicians alone. As such, it lacked the broad constituency and
staying power it needed to survive. Its leaders had promised to “protect” the
South from desegregation and indeed, for a short time, they did succeed in
stalling the implementation of the Brown ruling. In the end, however, their
actions lulled the white population into a false confidence, which made the
inevitable desegregation of Southern society all the more shocking to their
eyes. Massive resistance had not protected the old racial caste system of the
South. It had, perversely, helped assure its failure.
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